Brown v. Board of Education Essays - Free Essays, Term Papers

Brown v. Board of Education Essays - Free Essays, Term Papers Brown v. Board of Education Subject: History Brown v. Board of Education Brown v. Board of Education In 1896 the Supreme Court had held in Plessy v. Ferguson that racial segregation was permissible as long as equal facilities were provided for both races. Although that decision involved only passenger accommodations on a rail road, the principle of "separate but equal" was applied thereafter to all aspects of public life in states with large black populations. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, decided on May 17, 1954, was one of the most important cases in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court. Linda Brown had been denied admission to an elementary school in Topeka because she was black. Brought together under the Brown designation were companion cases from South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware, all of which involved the same basic question: Does the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment prohibit racial segregation in the public schools? It was not until the late 1940's that the Court began to insist on equality of treatment, but it did not squarely face the constitutionality of the "separate but equal" doctrine until it decided the Brown case. In a brief, unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court declared that: "separate education facilities are inherently unequal" and that racial segregation violates the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. In a moving passage, the chief justice argued that separating children in the schools solely on racial grounds "generates a felling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to be undone." Although the decision did not bring about total integration of blacks in the schools, it resulted in efforts by many school systems to remove the imbalance by busing students. The Court's decision had far reaching effects, influencing civil rights legislation and the civil rights movement of the 1960's.

Potential 2020 Republican Presidential Candidates

Potential 2020 Republican Presidential Candidates President Donald Trumps surprise win in 2016 was good news for many in the Republican Party. But the outsider non-politicians win did not make all conservative members of the GOP happy. Some preferred a standard-bearer for the party who fit a more traditional mold than the outspoken New York real estate developer and reality TV star. Others saw him as someone who doesnt actually hold the conservative values he espoused. Three Republicans already have indicated their interest in challenging Trump in the 2020 primary season, and pundits speculate that at least one more might join the race. Bill Weld Former Massachusetts Gov. Bill Welds last run for office was as vice president on the Libertarian Party ticket, but the former Massachusetts governor re-joined the Republican Party to officially challenge President Trump in April 2019. Despite Trumps 90 percent approval rating among GOP voters, Weld insisted in a CNN interview that he can beat the sitting president. His strategy includes getting on the ballot in states that allow for crossover voting, meaning that people who traditionally vote for Democrats are allowed to vote in the Republican primary. Larry Hogan Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan is a moderate Republican who has said he would consider running against Trump in 2020 only if he thought he had a reasonable chance of winning. But polling even in his home state has shown that while Marylanders love him as their governor, Republicans favor Trump in a 2020 primary contest 68 percent to 24 percent. Hogan announced in June 1, 2019 he would not run, saying he would instead lead an advocacy group called An America United. John Kasich Former Ohio Gov. John Kasich already challenged Trump once, in the 2016 primaries, and came up short. The former Ohio governor was tenacious nonetheless and stayed in the fight until the bitter end. Kasich has continued his criticisms of the president as a cable news commentator. He  was rumored to be considering a 2020 campaign, but on May 31, 2019, he announced that he will not run, telling CNN, There is no path right now for me. I dont see a way to get there. Justin Amash Rep. Justin Amash of Michigan is a vocal Trump critic in the U.S. House of Representatives and began being talked about as a challenger to the president after he was the lone Republican in the House to join Democrats in calling for Trumps impeachment in May 2019. But the speculation was not over whether Amash would challenge Trump in the GOP primary. Instead, observers wondered whether the libertarian-minded Amash might indeed jump to the Libertarian party where he might steal enough electoral votes to be a spoiler in the general election. Others Other more conservative Republicans are not interested in challenging a sitting president, either because they support his policies or because they dont want to hurt their own political futures. Those likely waiting for the 2024 election include names like Vice President Mike Pence, Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida, Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas, former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley, Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky, former Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker, or even former Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin.

Media, Culture and Identity Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Media, Culture and Identity - Essay Example The media therefore plays an important role in the formation of a cultural identity because of the vital role that it (the media) plays in the communication process. It is seen that communication is an important part in the formation of a cultural identity as it is the means through which people interact and through the interaction, the culture is transmitted. The media is therefore seen to play a vital role in the formation and in the transmission of cultural identity for different people. The media is important in that it facilitates the process of communication between the different people in a community. By facilitating the process of communication, the media makes a major contribution in the creation and in the spread of culture. The media also has an important role in the evolution of the different cultural practices. The media can be said to extend the human capability to create, spread, and store messages. By extension, the media also enhances the human capability to engage i n activities that are relevant to the different aspects of culture. When the process of communication is facilitated, the cultural practices can be spread. What is seen in the media is also a reflection of the cultural activities that are being engaged in by the people in the society (Gentz and Kramer 2). The increase in the consumption of media has been instrumental in the formation of identity. The introduction of new media and new media technologies has been linked to the formation of new patterns of identification. The cultural orientation of a given group of people and the way that people identify themselves change when they begin to consume the different kinds of new media and new technologies that are available to them. An example of the new media and media technology that has influenced the way people identify themselves and their cultural identity is the increased uptake of satellite television and the increased use of the internet. This is because of the interconnectedness and the high level of interaction that is offered by the new media. Media plays an important role in the formation of culture and identity in that it has increased the level of mobility that the community has access to. The mobility that the media offers is from the increased access to symbolic world that is enabled by the media. The media technology also brings change in cultural identity in that it increases the level of self sufficiency among the members of the given community. The interdependence that is offered by the media has led to a situation in which the global events and happenings have a major impact on the local culture. The local cultures of those who consume the media assimilate the culture of those that they watch and read about from the different media sources. The media is a major source of information as well as a source of cultural information. When it comes to transmitting cultural information the different actors and events in the media are typified into the d ifferent codes. They (actors and events) are also made to generic forms that are in line with the culture of a given society. The media through the different actors and events recreates the codes through which the events and actors are interpreted. The physical and social institutions as well as the cultural spaces have been reconstructed by the media, through the introduction of unlimited access to events and actors that are not physically

Geologic hazard project Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

Geologic hazard project - Essay Example Earthquakes are not isolated events as they occur in sequences. Most often, each series is dominated by an event with a larger magnitude than all others in the sequence. Smaller earthquakes and aftershocks may follow the main shock, sometimes several hours, months, or even several years later. Earthquakes are inevitable in many parts throughout the world. It can damage the infrastructure. It causes ground shaking, ground displacement, flooding and fire that can cause great damage to the people of the region affected. For example, when an earthquake occurred in the state of Washington, more than a billion dollars worth of buildings got destroyed. Roads and bridges in the region affected became inaccessible, water pressure fail and gas lines break and leak leading to fires spread that causes severe damage. Earthquakes cause Water level in the sea to rise suddenly, causing very high waves, several meters in height, which then flood the coastal areas. These possibly give rise to tsunamis, causing damage to coastal areas (Ammon). It is important to have earthquake knowledge and learn about how to minimize its effects. Its preparedness can reduce the number of the casualties, and the value of the properties destroyed. To understand earthquakes allows saving lives and to reduce damages, injuries. It also allows to build buildings more earthquakes resistant and find the locations that are more prone to earthquake. Earthquakes have been recorded throughout history for many years. Even before seismographs in early times, there are a record of mysterious ground shaking. It occurs when rocks break along an underground fault. The ground shaking causes vibrations through the earth. The magnitude of the shaking varies on how great the movement along the fault is. When plates shift, they create shockwaves that go through the earth.The shock

Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 Essay Example for Free

Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 Essay The invasion was the result of a long-standing territorial dispute. Iraq accused Kuwait of violating the Iraqi border to secure oil resources, (on July 17, 1990 Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of flooding the world oil market. In addition, he singled out Kuwait for the production of oil from a disputed supply, the Rumaila oil field), and demanded that its debt repayments should be waived. (7:1) Direct negotiations were begun in July 1990, but they were destined soon to fail; along with reassurance from the United States making a claim that they would not get involved (the famous meeting of Saddam Hussein with April Glaspie, the United States Ambassador to Iraq, on the 25th of July, 1990). This was the go ahead that Hussein needed. (8:1) Arab mediators convinced Iraq and Kuwait to negotiate their differences in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, on August 1, 1990, but that session resulted only in charges and countercharges. A second session was scheduled to take place in Baghdad, the Iraqi capital, but Iraq invaded Kuwait the next day. (9:1) Iraqi troops overran the country shortly after midnight on 2nd August 1990. The U. S. fell short on its claim to not get involved and instantly declared interest in keeping Saudi Arabia safe. (10:1) The History of Operation Desert Strom: On the morning of August 2, 1990 the mechanized infantry, armor, and tank units of the Iraqi Republican Guard invaded Kuwait and seized control of that country. The invasion triggered a United States response, Operation DESERT SHIELD, to deter any invasion of Kuwaits oil rich neighbor, Saudi Arabia. On August 7, deployment of U. S. forces began. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660 and 662 condemned Iraqs invasion and annexation and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces. On August 20 President Bush signed National Security Directive 45, U. S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, outlining U. S. objectives which included the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and the restoration of Kuwaits legitimate government to replace the puppet regime installed by Iraq. (2) A U. N. ultimatum, Security Council Resolution 678, followed on November 29, 1990. It stipulated that if Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein did not remove his troops from Kuwait by January 15, 1991 a U. S. -led coalition was authorized to drive them out. Early in the morning of January 17, Baghdad time, the U. S. -led coalition launched air attacks against Iraqi targets. On February 24, coalition ground forces begin their attack. On February 27, Kuwait City was declared liberated, and with allied forces having driven well into Iraq, President Bush and his advisers decided to halt the war. A cease-fire took effect at 8:00 the following morning. (3) A crucial element of the Persian Gulf war was the Iraqi launch of its modified Scud missiles. Iraq originally obtained Scud missiles, along with much of the rest of its military equipment, from their producerthe Soviet Union. This 1970s study provides basic data on various aspects of the Scud Bincluding, among others, its range, payload, warhead type, and accuracy. It also provides information on the background of the missile and conclusions based on U. S. materiel exploitation of one or more Scuds. (4) On December 2, 1990, six weeks before the United States and its allies initiated Operation Desert Storm, Iraq test launched three Scud missiles from sites in eastern Iraq, which impacted in western Iraq. This DIA report, based at least in part on data from Defense Support Program launch detection satellites, provides first notification of the launch and basic data on the nature of the missilesincluding type, launch sites and impact areasas well as other relevant information. It was reported that the Iraqi test firing allowed the U. S. to fine-tune its launch detection system, which proved of great value during Desert Storm. (5) During the Persian Gulf War Iraq fired 88 Iraqi-modified Scuds at Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. The Scud attacks on Israel threatened to provoke Israel into a counterattack, which the U. S. wished to avoid for fear that it would shatter the Allied coalition. From the beginning of the war destruction of Iraqi Scuds represented a high priority for U. S. and allied forceswhich involved the use of space systems, aerial platforms, and special operations forces. Destruction of Iraqs mobile Scud forces proved far more difficult than expected, in part due to Iraqi tactics. At wars end there had been no confirmed kills of mobile Scuds. This post-war DIA assessment focuses on a number of subjects, including pre-war intelligence assumptions, Iraqi Scud deployment and dispersal, the capabilities of Iraqs extended range Scuds, and means of measuring the effectiveness of the counter-Scud effort. It concluded that the lessons learned during Operation DESERT STORM can provide the framework for developing a more effective, realistic approach to targeting both Third World ballistic missiles and Soviet mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles in the future. (6) A key element in allied success in the Persian Gulf War was the U. S. -British led air campaign prior to the commencement of the ground campaign. That air campaign marked the first major use of the F-117A, Nighthawk, stealth fighter, the existence of which was declassified in 1988 shortly before its first combat in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989. This chronology, in addition to covering events related to F-117A deployment and operations, provides a day-by-day, wave-by-wave, account of operations against Iraqi targets. It provides specifics on targets, bombs dropped, and the 37th Fighter Wings general assessment of the effectiveness of the attacks. Subsequent studies of F-117A operations, such as that of the General Accounting Office, were more skeptical of the F-117A effectiveness. (7) What is the situation now in the context of 1990 war?

Gender Issues In Lysistrata Essay -- essays research papers

Human beings are amazing creatures. Our history has shown spectacular and shameful events from day one. Throughout the course of history we have seen both war and peace. More war than peace, but the point still remains. That we, as a human race, have accomplished many wonderful intellectual break-throughs but we have also done very stupid deeds. Its amazing how a creature of such great intelligence could separate, segregate, discriminate, dehumanize, and enslave members of its own human race.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   The world as we speak is existing because of gender issues. Going back to days of Adam and Eve. When God asked Adam not to eat from the apple tree, it was Eve, with her feminine lure, who was able to convince Adam to disobey Gods rules and eat the apple. Yet when God came to punish Adam for disobeying the rules, Adam pointed to Eve and blamed her for luring him into the sin of eating the apple. Yet in reality it was the serpent, which was the devil, that lured them into eating the apple. But of course Adam, being male had to blame Eve, the female. Which is typical male behavior to blame the woman, my sister says. In general men don’t take responsibility for their actions. Michealangelo has portrayed all this on the Sistienth Chapel. He has painted a picture that is portraying God punishing Adam for eating the apple. In this painting Adam loses his masculine image by pointing to Eve and blaming her for the problems that were caused by eating the apple.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Men threw out history have always been perceived as strong, powerful, heroic beings. Men are depicted as fighters, providers, and of course first class citizens. While woman on the other hand have always been perceived as weak, fainty, delicate homemakers, and unintelligent. Their main purpose in life is to cater for the men, and take care of the house and kids. And of course they were perceived as second class citizens.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The focus of this paper is to analyze the gender issues and differences that existed in all three plays. I would like to relate and compare these issues to our past as humans and to our modern day present.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  We see a wide array of controversial gender issues arise in Lysistrata. This play starts off by showing the main character as a strong independent woman. The beginning of the play focuses on Lysistrata resentment and anger toward the woman of the town. She sees her ow... ...uff and leave the town, with out ridicule and hardship. They seemed to be â€Å"stuck';, in the sense that is very hard to leave a small town.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The role of the women was to get married, stay home and take care of the kids, while the man provides and puts food on the table. This view is still somewhat shared with our society today.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  In conclusion it would be safe to say that all three plays relate gender issues to their time set. We can see many similarities within all three of these plays, and we can also see similarities that arise with our culture today. Even though today women are not treated as bad as they were. It is sad to say that even in the year 2000 women don’t have equal rights and don’t get equal treatment. Women still make .70 cents to the dollar as men. Their role is still to be the homemaker. And they hold such a small percentage of any policy making position. To think of all the lost talent and all the advances that could have been made to help our society is truly a sad and inhuman thought, that can get any one angry with our history. If one was to really think about it, the human race has not made much progress with the treatment of women.

Analysis of Secure Real Time Transport Protocol on Voip over

Mohd Nazri Ismail / (IJCSE) International Journal on Computer Science and Engineering Vol. 02, No. 03, 2010, 898-902 Analysis of Secure Real Time Transport Protocol on VoIP over Wireless LAN in Campus Environment Mohd Nazri Ismail Department of MIIT, University of Kuala Lumpur (UniKL), MALAYSIA [email  protected] unikl. edu. my Abstract- In this research, we propose to implement Secure Real Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) on VoIP services in campus environment. Today, the deployment of VoIP in campus environment over wireless local area network (WLAN) is not considered on security during communication between two parties.Therefore, this study is to analyzed SRTP performance on different VoIP codec selection over wired. We have implemented a real VoIP network in University of Kuala Lumpur (UniKL), Malaysia. We use softphone as our medium communication between two parties in campus environment. The results show that implementation of SRTP is able to improve the VoIP quality between on e-to-one conversation and multi conference call (many-to-many). In our experiment, it shows that iLBC, SPEEX and GSM codec are able to improve significantly the multi conference (many-to-many) VoIP quality during conversation.In additional, implementation of SRTP on G. 711 and G. 726 codec will decrease the multi conference (many-to-many) VoIP quality. Keywords- Codecs, Softphone, SRTP, WLAN I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORKS University of Kuala Lumpur (UniKL) has implemented a real VoIP over wireless LAN in campus environment. This implementation is not covered any security features. Therefore, the objective of this study is to enable the security function using Secure Real Time Transport Protocol (SRTP).We will study the performance of SRTP on different codec such as G. 711, G. 726, GSM, iLBC and SPEEX. iLBC is a speech codec developed for robust voice communication over IP, it uses 13. 33 Kbps. It provides low delay and high packet loss robustness for low-bit rate codec’s. SPEEX codec is open source patent-free audio compression format designed for speech. Codec is an algorithm used to encode and decode the voice conversation. Secure Real Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) defines a profile of Real Time Transport Protocol (RTP), intended to provide ncryption, message authentication and integrity and replay protection to the RTP data in both unicast and multicast applications. Previous work is to evaluate the trade-off existing between quality of service and security when SRTP [6] is employed to protect RTP (Real Time Protocol) sessions on VoIP calls [5]. There is no such study has been conducted on comparison of VoIP one-to-one call and multi conference call (many-to-many) performance using SRTP functionality. With its promise of inclusion, innovation, and growth, VoIP also brings challenges. VoIP is not easy to secure.It suffers all of the problems associated with any Internet application, and VoIP security is complicated by its interconnection to the PS TN. A host of trust, implementation, and operational complexities make securing VoIP particularly complex. In fact, the same aspects that make the VoIP software model so powerful—its flexible, open, distributed design—are what make it potentially problematic [7][8]. Various security requirements have to be met to secure VoIP transmission: Authentication, Privacy and Confidentiality, Integrity, Non repudiation, Non replay and Resource availability [9].The threats faced by a VoIP are similar to other applications including: unwanted communication (spam), privacy violations (unlawful intercept), impersonation (masquerading), theft-of service, and denial-of-service [10]. II. METHODOLOGY We have setup a real wireless network environment to analyze and measure implementation of VoIP service using security function (SRTP) at University of Kuala Lumpur (UniKL) in Malaysia. This study posits several research questions: i) what is the STRP performance level of the VoIP over WLAN based on one-to-one call and multi conference call? nd ii) which codecs are able to provide better improvement of VoIP conversation? Figure 2. 1 and Figure 2. 2 show the flow of VoIP conversation call between one-to-one and multi conference. We measure our voice quality using human perception. Mean Opinion Score (MOS) technique is the best approach to measure and ISSN : 0975-3397 898 Mohd Nazri Ismail / (IJCSE) International Journal on Computer Science and Engineering Vol. 02, No. 03, 2010, 898-902 validate voice quality between one-to-one call and multi conference call. Figure 2. 3 shows the measurement of VoIP performance over WLAN using SRTP implementation.We also test on different codecs selection such G. 711, G. 726, GSM, iLBC and SPEEX. III. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS Figure 2. 1: VoIP over One-to-One Conversation This section measures and compares VoIP performance over WLAN using SRTP function. In voice and video communication, quality usually dictates whether the experience is a good or bad one. Besides the qualitative description we hear, like ‘quite good' or ‘very bad', there is a numerical method of expressing voice and video quality. It is called Mean Opinion Score (MOS). MOS can be tested using: i) human perception; ii) simulation model; and iii) automated system [1] [2].MOS gives a numerical indication of the perceived quality of the media received after being transmitted and eventually compressed using codecs. MOS is expressed in one number, from 1 to 5, 1 being the worst and 5 the best. MOS is quite subjective; as it is based figures that result from what is perceived by people during tests (refer to Table 3. 1). We will select five different users to evaluate and rate the VoIP performance using SRTP and without SRTP functionality. When users cannot get a dial tone or there are excessive delays in ringing the other party’s phone, VoIP performance is unacceptable.Call quality is a function of packet loss rate, delay, and jitter is typically represented as a MOS [3], [4]. Table 3. 1: Mean Opinion Score (MOS) Ratings Mean Opinion Score (MOS) Ratings Excellent 5 (Perfect. Like face-to-face conversation Figure 2. 2: VoIP over Many-to-Many (Multi Conference) Conversation Good Fair Poor Bad or radio reception) 4 (Fair. Imperfections can be perceived, but sound still clear. This is (supposedly) the range for cell phones) 3 (Annoying) 2 (Very annoying. Nearly impossible to communicate) 1 (Impossible to communicate) Figure 3. shows the configuration of codec protocol such as G. 711, G. 726, GSM, iLBC and SPEEX. This 3CX softphone is able to active ‘Echo Cancellation’ and ‘SRTP’. The VoIP experiments will receive two types of modes: i) one-to-one call conversation; ii) multi conference call (many-to-many). Figure 3. 2 shows the result of VoIP one-to-one conversation. Figure 3. 3 shows the result of VoIP multi conference (many-to-many) call. Figure 2. 3: Measurement and Evaluation of VoIP over WLAN using SRTP Approach ISSN : 0975-3397 899 Mohd Nazri Ismail / (IJCSE) International Journal on Computer Science and Engineering Vol. 2, No. 03, 2010, 898-902 improvement on VoIP quality performance and at the same time able to provide element of security (refer to Table 3. 3 and Figure 3. 5). The significant improvement is GSM and SPEEX codecs after implemented SRTP. Table 3. 2: Multi Conference without SRTP User Codec Figure 3. 1: 3CX Softphone Codec and SRTP Configuration G. 711 G. 726 GSM iLBC SPEEX User 1 3 4 1 2 5 User 2 3 3 1 2 4 User 3 2 3 1 3 4 User 4 3 4 1 2 4 User 5 2 4 1 2 5 Figure 3. 2: One-to-One Call Conversation Result Figure 3. 4: Users Rate VoIP for Multi Conference Call Without SRTP Table 3. : Multi Conference with SRTP User Codec G. 711 G. 726 GSM iLBC SPEEX Figure 3. 3: Multi Conference Call (many-tomany) Conversation Result Most of the users agreed and rates this VoIP without SRTP will provide a good quality for G. 711 and G. 726 codecs. Other users agreed a nd rates 4 to 5 ratings for SPEEX codec without using SRTP during multi conference conversation (refer to Table 3. 2 and Figure 3. 4). After implemented SRTP on VoIP during multi conference session occurs, it shows some User 1 2 3 4 5 5 User 2 1 3 4 5 5 User 3 1 2 3 4 5 User 4 2 2 3 4 5 User 5 1 2 3 4 5 ISSN : 0975-3397 900Mohd Nazri Ismail / (IJCSE) International Journal on Computer Science and Engineering Vol. 02, No. 03, 2010, 898-902 Table 3. 5: One-to-One Call with SRTP User Codec G. 711 G. 726 GSM iLBC SPEEX User 1 2 3 2 4 5 User 2 1 3 2 4 4 User 3 1 2 2 4 5 User 4 2 2 2 4 4 User 5 2 3 2 4 5 Figure 3. 5: Users Rate VoIP for Multi Conference Call With SRTP Most of the users agreed and rates this VoIP oneto-one call without SRTP will also provide low quality for G. 711, G. 726 and GSM codecs. Other users agreed and rates 3 and 5 ratings for iLBC and SPEEX codecs without using SRTP during one-to-one call (refer to Table 3. and Figure 3. 6). After implemented SRTP on VoIP during o ne-to-one session occurs, it shows significant improvement on VoIP quality performance for G. 711, G. 726, GSM, iLBC and SPEEX over WLAN (refer to Table 3. 5 and Figure 3. 7). Table 3. 4: One-to-One Call Without SRTP User Codec G. 711 G. 726 GSM iLBC SPEEX User 1 2 1 2 3 5 User 2 2 2 2 3 4 User 3 2 1 2 4 4 User 4 1 1 1 3 4 User 5 1 2 2 4 4 Figure 3. 7: Users Rate VoIP for One-to-One Call with SRTP Figure 3. 8 and Figure 3. 9 show the average MOS score for VoIP conversation over one-to-one call and multi conference call (many-to-many), respectively.VoIP Conversation over Multi Conference Call: Before implemented SRTP, the average MOS score for G. 711 is 2. 5, 3. 5 for G. 726, 1 for GSM, 2. 1 for iLBC and 4. 5 for SPEEX. After implemented SRTP, the average MOS score for G. 711 and G. 726 are decreased the ratings approximately 1 to 2. 5. GSM, iLBC and SPEEX codecs show the average MOS score are 3. 5, 4. 5 and 5. GSM, iLBC and SPEEX codec show the increasing of VoIP performance after i mplemented SRTP (refer to Figure 3. 8). VoIP Conversation over One-to-One Call: Before implemented SRTP, the average MOS score for G. 711 is 1. , 1. 4 for G. 726, 1. 8 for GSM, 3. 5 for iLBC and 4. 2 for SPEEX. After implemented SRTP, the average MOS score shows the significant improvement for G. 711, G. 726, GSM, iLBC and SPEEX codecs. Therefore, implementation of SRTP can improve the VoIP quality performance for one-to-one call over WLAN (refer to Figure 3. 9). Figure 3. 6: Users Rate VoIP for One-to-One Call without SRTP ISSN : 0975-3397 901 Mohd Nazri Ismail / (IJCSE) International Journal on Computer Science and Engineering Vol. 02, No. 03, 2010, 898-902 dependency conditions that could influence voice quality.Future work, we will extend our experiment on VoIP over VPN implementation in Campus environment. References [1]. Moura N. T. ; Vianna B. A. ; Albuquergue C. V. N; Rebello V. E. F & Boeres C. â€Å"MOS-Based Rate Adaption for VoIP Sources†. IEEE International Confe rence on Communication, pp. 628-633, 2007. [2]. Masuda M. & Ori K. â€Å"Delay Variation Metrics for Speech Quality Estimation of VoIP†. Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers (IEIC) Technical Report, Vol. 101(11), pp. 101-106, 2001. [3]. R. G. Cole & J. H. Rosenbluth. â€Å"Voice over IP Performance Monitoring†. SIGCOMM Computer Communication Rev.Vol. 31(2), pp. 9-24, 2001. [4]. L. Ding & R. Goubran. â€Å"Speech Quality Prediction in VoIP Using the Extended e-Model. Global Telecommunication Conference, GLOBECOM ’03. IEEE, Vol. 7, pp. 3974-3978, 2003. [5]. Alexandre P. ; Edjair M. ; & Edjard M. â€Å"Analysis of the Secure RTP Protocol on Voice over Wireless Networks using Extended MedQoS†. Proceedings of the 2009 ACM symposium on Applied Computing, pp. 86 – 87, 2009. [6]. M. Baugher, D. McGrew, M. Naslund, E. Carrara, & K. Norrman. â€Å"The Secure Real- Time Transport Protocol (SRTP)†. RFC 3711 (Proposed Standa rd), March 2004. [7] Douglas C. Sicker & Tom L. VoIP Security: Not an Afterthought†, FEATURE: Q focus: Voice Over IP, Vol. 2(6), pp. 56-64, 2004. [8] Vesselin I. , Theodor T. , & Amdt T. â€Å"Experiences in VoIP telephone network security policy at the University of Applied Sciences (FHTW) Berlin†, Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Computer systems and technologies, Bulgaria, Vol. 285(3), 2007. [9] Wafaa B. D. , Samir T. , & Carole B. â€Å"Critical vpn security analysis and new approach for securing voip communications over vpn networks†, Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Wireless multimedia networking and performance modelling,Chania, Crete Island, Greece, pp. 2-96, 2007. [10] Nekita A. C. , & Chhabria S. A. â€Å"Multiple design patterns for voice over IP security†, Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Computing, Communication and Control, Mumbai, India, pp. 530 – 534, 2009. Figure 3. 8: VoIP Conversa tion over Multi Conference Call over WLAN Figure 3. 9: VoIP Conversation over One-to-One Call over WLAN IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK Based on the results, implementation of SRTP using GSM, iLBC and SPEEX codecs are able to generate high quality of VoIP conversation WLAN for one-to-one conversation and multi conference call (many-to-many).After implemented SRTP for multi conference call (many-to-many), the MOS result indicates that G. 711 and G. 726 codec will decrease the performance of VoIP conversation over WLAN. Overall of our finding, it confirms that enable SRTP will improve and increase the quality of one-to-one VoIP conversation and VoIP over multi conference call (only for iLBC, GSM and SPEEX codecs). Since the manual/human MOS tests are quite subjective and less than productive in many ways, there are nowadays a number of software tools that carry out automated MOS testing in a VoIP deployment.Although they lack the human touch, the good thing with these tests is that the y take into account all the network ISSN : 0975-3397 902 Copyright of International Journal on Computer Science & Engineering is the property of Engg Journals Publications and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

Is Lebanon a Fragile State?

Introduction Middle Eastern nation states came into existence not as a result of naturally-evolving and unique historical, social, or political processes reaching a nexus of cohesion, but rather, they emerged as a manifestation of the fragility of colonial power in the region (Zweiri a. o. 2008: 4). The history of statehood in the Middle East and its establishment by colonial powers has ensured that this remains a fragile and unstable region (Zweiri a. o. 2008: 4).After the collapse of the Ottoman empire the state structure of Lebanon, for example, was instituted to ensure the protection and local hegemony of the Christian Maronites, who were backed by the French in the 1930s and 1940s (Zweiri a. o. 2008: 4). The consequences of this structuring can still be felt today (Zweiri a. o. 2008: 4). Furthermore, external actors continue to provide support – either through foreign aid or their policies – to certain select actors within fragile state systems.Such a process of â €Å"choosing sides† only causes further instability and exacerbates state fragility (Zweiri a. o. 2008: 4). In the contemporary turbulent world of globalization and ever-increasing interdependence across individuals, groups, international organizations and nation-states, the existence of weak/fragile/failed states is more and more seen as a significant concern (Iqbal & Starr 2007: 2). The media, states, and international organizations have seen such states as threats to order and stability in the international system (Iqbal & Starr 2007: 2).Failed states are seen as being associated with a range of problems: economic, social, political, and military (Iqbal & Starr 2007: 3). And they are seen as having a wide range of negative consequences for their own people, their neighbors, their regions, and the global community; â€Å"the chief reason why the world should worry about state failure is that it is contagious† (The Economist, cited in Iqbal & Starr 2007: 3). Is Lebano n a fragile state?Since her independence Lebanon has struggled in keeping up the difficult balance: a small country in a conflict zone, Christians versus Muslims, the civil war, the negative influence of big neighbor Syria, the role of the Palestinians and the refugee problem, the tension with Israel, the murder of former prime minister Rafik Hariri on 14 February 2005 which put the political order of the country in great danger, the emergence of Muslim adicalism and extremism and the rise of Hezbollah, the crumbling of the Christian community and the role of the Lebanese diasporas. To answer this question the political order of Lebanon will be examined from a geo-political and internal perspective. The book Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis, is taken as starting point for this paper. It is one of the books from the ‘Middle East in Focus series’, edited by Barry Rubin. The Middle East has become simultaneously the world’s most controversial, crisis-ridden, and yet least-understood region.Taking new perspectives on the area that has undergone the most dramatic changes, the Middle East in Focus series seeks to bring the best, most accurate expertise to bear for understanding the area’s countries, issues, and problems. The resulting books are designed to be balanced, accurate, and comprehensive compendiums of both facts and analysis presented clearly for both experts and the general reader. To answer the central question, the concept of a ‘fragile state’ will first be scrutinized. In the following section the demographics of Lebanon will be reflected upon. The third section outlines the Lebanese state and political system.The fourth section takes into consideration the external influences on the country. The final section depicts the effects of these various factors on the fragility of the Lebanese political system. 1. Conceptualization and determinants of a fragile state The Failed States Index 2010 ranks Lebanon on the 34th place. With a score of 90. 9/120 the country is considered to be â€Å"in danger† (Foreign Policy 2011b). What does â€Å"state failure† actually mean? There is no agreement on what constitutes fragility and no state likes to be labeled as fragile by the international community (Iqbal & Starr: 4, see also Stewart and Brown 2010).Below a set of existing definitions or characterizations of the general phenomenon of state failure will be outlined. It is helpful to begin by looking at existing definitions within the aid community. According to the Fund for Peace â€Å"A state that is failing has several attributes. One of the most common is the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes of state failure include the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to nteract with other states as a full member of the inte rnational community. The 12 social, economic, political and military indicators cover a wide range of elements of the risk of state failure, such as extensive corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain drain, and environmental decay. States can fail at varying rates through explosion, implosion, erosion, or invasion over different time periods. (Foreign Policy 2011a). The UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) definition of fragile states focuses on service entitlements (Stewart and Brown 2005: 1-2). DfID defines fragile states as occurring â€Å"†¦ where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. The most important functions of the state for poverty re duction are territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves. (DfID 2005: 7). Four broad categories of â€Å"indicative features of fragile states† were provided: state authority for safety and security; effective political power; economic management; administrative capacity to deliver services (Iqball & Starr: 4). Each was categorized in terms of â€Å"capacity† to provide them, and the â€Å"willingness† to provide them (Iqball & Starr: 4). In as much, DfID explicitly notes that it does not restrict its definition of fragility to conflict or immediate post-conflict countries (Stewart and Brown 2005: 2).Non-conflict countries which are failing to ensure service entitlements constitute fragile states under DfID’s definition; similarly, countries in conflict but which are nonetheless providing an acceptabl e level of service entitlements to the majority of the population would not constitute fragile states under DfID’s definition (Stewart and Brown 2005: 2). The definition which the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) employs, is similar but goes beyond a government’s failure to provide comprehensive services and includes the protection of the population’s human rights and security: ‘States are fragile when state tructures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations’ (Stewart & Brown 2010: 9). Finally, for the World Bank ‘fragile states’ refers to â€Å"countries facing particularly severe development challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. Often these countries experience ongoing violence as the residue of past severe conflict.Ongoing ar med conflicts affect three out of four fragile states† (World Bank 2011). From this brief review, we can see that there are considerable areas of overlap in the current use of the term ‘fragile states’ within the development community, but also differences of breadth and emphasis. Here, in this paper, fragile states are to be defined as states that are failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive basic service provision, or legitimacy.Authority failures are cases where the state lacks the authority to protect its citizens from violence of various kinds; service failures are cases where the state fails to ensure that all citizens have access to basic services; legitimacy failures occur where the state lacks legitimacy (Stewart & Brown 2010: 10). 2. Demographic dilemmas One of the features that distinguish Lebanon in the region is its social composition, a spectrum of different religious minorities. (Fawaz 2009: 25). A large majority of t he 4. million Lebanese belong to one of three main sects—Sunni Muslims, Shi’a Muslims, and Maronite Christians—with Greek Orthodox, Druze, and over a dozen other groups comprising the rest (Farha 2009: 83). Demographic and political representations never fully overlapped in the course of Lebanon’s history (Farha 2009: 83). Recurrent phases of incongruity between demographic and political balances of power have been a major driving force in all cycles of conflict (Farha 2009: 83). â€Å"Lebanon’s modern history has been punctuated by periodic outbreaks of fratricidal violence, followed by political compromises that recalibrated the istribution of power and privilege among the major confessional communities† (Farha 2009:83). Let’s have a closer look at the demographics of Lebanon. In Lebanon we find higher Muslims birthrates (Farha 2009: 87). Fertility favors the Shi’a of Lebanon in particular and the Muslims in general (Raphaeli 2009: 110). However, a projection based on fertility rates, ignores the lower infant and child mortality rates among Christians, which have counterbalanced higher Muslim birthrates to some extent (Farha 2009: 87).Some doubt should always be cast on the accuracy of projected estimates with regard to the precise size of the resident population as the last census took place in 1932. Different actors present different numbers for different political reasons (Farha 2009). Emigration is a big issue; there are more Lebanese living abroad than Lebanese-born living inside the country. A disproportionately high rate of Christian emigration took place from the mid-nineteenth- through the twentieth century, particularly during and after eruptions of civil strife in 1860, 1914–1918, and 1975–1990 (Farha 2009: 86). Over 900,000 Lebanese emigrated between the outbreak of civil war in 1975 and 2001† (Farha 2009: 86). By 2006, the size of the Christian community was reduced to 3 0 percent of the total Lebanese population (Raphaeli 2009: 110). However it is said that these recent immigrants were not only Christians, but also Muslims (Farha 2009: 86). It is debated whether the Christian Lebanese people worldwide outnumber the Muslim Lebanese. Against the notion that descendants of Lebanese Christians comprise the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese in the diaspora, Farha (2009: 86) argues that emigration is equally sought By Muslims and Christians.Moreover, a 2006 study conducted by the Lebanese Emigration Research Center at NDU found that the percentage departure rates within each confession were almost equal (Farha 2009: 86). This is politically relevant as MP Nimtallah Abi Nasr hopes to expand the prospective pool of expatriate Christian voters with his campaign for a (re)naturalization of second and third-generation Lebanese abroad (Farha 2009: 87). Also â€Å"Hezbollah has actively encouraged first-generation Shi’a emigrants to register their c hildren as citizens for much the same reason (Farha 2009: 87)†.Lebanon’s current power sharing covenant is far out of step with demographic realities (Farha 2009: 88). â€Å"Even the most conservative statistical conjectures leave Lebanese Muslims significantly underrepresented in the parliament and the council of ministers, an incongruity that will grow in the years ahead† (Farha 2009: 88). A revision of the 1989 Ta’if agreement, which was the basis for ending the decades-long Lebanese civil war, and in which the Christians gave up their majority whereby granting Muslims a true partnership in the political process, has been discussed though.However, up till now we see that the Ta’if agreement is being preserved not amended. Amending the Ta’if will not serve the interests of the Christians considering the population-increase of non-Christians. In view of the growing disequilibrium between demographic and political representation in Lebanon, a recalibration of the Ta’if power-sharing formula along the lines of a tripartite division of power (muthalatha) among Christians, Sunnis, and Shi’a is all but inevitable in the coming years (Farha 2009: 90).While a tripartite division of power may not correspond precisely with Lebanon’s demographic balance, it is the closest possible approximation in the absence of a census and the only recalibration formula that could conceivably win the support of all three (Farha 2009: 90). â€Å"So long as no one sect compromises a demographic majority few Lebanese would feel themselves egregiously underrepresented by a tripartite division of power† (Farha 2009: 90).However, while proposals to this effect have circulated for over two decades a sweeping revision of the Constitution is highly unlikely in the short term (Farha 2009: 90). â€Å"Indeed, the main leaders of both March 14 and the opposition have explicitly rejected Sunni-Shi’a-Christian tripartism a s an alternative to Muslim-Christian parity—a position that perhaps has less to do with innate preferences than with the political exigencies of appealing to a deeply divided and anxious Christian community† (Farha 2009: 90).Ideally, Lebanon should of course be reconfigured on a non-confessional basis. A political system is needed which is not based on the (numerical) strength of religious communities. â€Å"Although, deconfessionalization may be a better cure for Lebanon’s ailments in principle, in practice those who hold positions of power under the sectarian system are not likely to promulgate its abrogation† (Farha 2009: 90) . 3. The dilemmas of the Lebanese political system and state 3. The state â€Å"In Lebanon there is controversy over the nature of the state, as well as over national identity† (El-Khazer 2004: 6). There is a problem of defining the boundaries of the state and, more important, of the nation (El-Khazen 2004: 6). Lebanon is a multi-communal state which raises the question of legitimacy, and, by extension, the effectiveness of the political system in situations of crisis (El-Khazen 2004: 6). We see loyalties transcending state boundaries.El-Khazen (2004: 8) argues that several, interpretations explaining the weakness of the Lebanese state, and later the causes of its collapse in the mid-1970s such as the growing imbalance between loads and capabilities on the political system, the divisive forces inherent in Lebanon’s political system, increasing socio-economic inequalities along sectarian, class and regional lines or government inefficiency, nepotism and corruption, are of limited explanatory value, as none of these problems where unique to Lebanon. While Lebanon shares broad characteristic with other heterogeneous societies, it has particular features of its own† (El-Khazen 2004: 32).First Lebanon has a large number of communities that are politically active, some of whom have distinctly co mmunal agenda’s; second, in Lebanon there is no numerically dominant group which constitutes 60 or 70 percent of the total population (furthermore, the differences in the size of the three major groups are relatively small, which limits political significance); third is the changing demographic balance in Lebanon; fourth, communal transformations in Lebanon have not reached a significant degree of maturity, moreover, in Lebanon communal development has been in constant flux and disputes have changed partly because of internal politics and partly because of the unstable regional situation which has deeply affected Lebanon; fifth, what sets Lebanon apart from other divided societies is the regional order with which it has had to interact, the Middle East in one of the most unstable regional orders in the post-Second World War international system (El-Khazen 2004: 32).Where Lebanon’s problems ultimately differ according to El-Khazen (2004: 10) is in the nature and scope o f externally-generated problems originating mainly from its regional order – specifically the Arab state system and post-1967 PLO. â€Å"Lebanon’s confessional political system (†¦) functioned relatively well for over three decades. It collapsed when it was subjected to pressure, particularly externally-generated pressure, which the system could not contain while preserving its open character and the plural nature of society† (El-Kahzen 2004:32). El-Khazen (2004: 6) suggests three phases which characterize the breakdown of the state in Lebanon: first the erosion and eventual loss of power; second, the political paralysis and power vacuum; third, the collapse of state institutions and the eruption of violence. 3. 2 The political systemEver since it attained independence from the French in 1943, Lebanon’s political system has been based on the National Charter (al-mithaq al-watani)—an unwritten but enforced pact that recognizes the division of t he country into religious communities (Raphaeli 2009: 110). According to the 1943 National Pact between sectarian leaders, the president would be a Maronite; the prime minister a Sunni; and the parliamentary speaker a Shi’a (Harris 2009: 16). The charter’s distribution of power among the various religious communities reflects the fact that in the 1940s, Christians represented 60 percent of the population and the various Muslim communities occupied the remaining 40 percent (Raphaeli 2009: 110).This was adjusted to an even split in 1989. Unstable multisectarian factions rather than ideological parties have dominated the legislature (Harris 2009: 17). The Lebanese political system has some positives to it. First, Lebanon is one of the very few Middle Eastern countries where the government arises from parliament (Harris 2009: 17). Second, the Lebanese system has been the political framework for a dynamic public pluralism unheard of anywhere else in the Arab world (Harris 2 009: 17). Even the intimidation from 1990 to 2005 by the Damascus-directed security apparatus did not destroy a freewheeling civil society and an assertive media (Harris 2009: 17).Third, the reemergence of â€Å"confessional democracy† in May 2005, with Syria’s enforced military withdrawal and the first free elections since 1972, produced a parliamentary balance close to the probable numerical weight of major political forces (Harris 2009: 17). Still, Lebanon’s political system has many deficiencies. Between 1975 and 2005, it effectively ceased to function, with 15 years of violent breakdown followed by 15 years of manipulative Syrian hegemony—a hegemony approved by the West until about 2000 (Harris 2009: 17). Even when operating, the system has never reconciled representation of communities with representation of individual citizens (Harris 2009: 17). Parliamentary deputies are elected under sectarian labels at the same time as they are constitutionally bound to act for the citizenry regardless of sect (Harris 2009: 17).The allocation of parliamentary seats has become out of line with the numerical weighting of the communities (Harris 2009: 17). Only an internationally supervised census, which no one wants, can resolve the issue (Harris 2009: 17). Every community has its demographic mythology, which they do not want punctured (Harris 2009: 17). The Shi’a community has increased from one-fifth of the population in 1932 to probably around one-third today. Even under the 1989 adjustment, it gets 27 seats out of 128 when it should have at least 40 (Harris 2009: 17). 4. Regionally powered dilemmas â€Å"The external connections of Lebanon’s communal blocs involve antagonists in Middle Eastern disputes† (Harris 2009: 10).The Maronite Catholics have longstanding relations with the west; Lebanon’s Shi’a provided religious scholars who assisted the conversion of Iranians to Twelver Shi’ism in the si xteenth century, Lebanese Sunni affinities is more with Saudi-Arabia (Harris 2009: 10). The extension of Lebanon’s differences reach[es] into the divide between Sunni Arab states and Shi’a Iran and into the standoff between the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia on one hand and Syria and Iran on the other. â€Å"In this sense, Lebanon really is the cockpit of the Middle East† (Harris 2009: 10). As we shall see it is in Syrian, Israeli and Iran’s interest to see a high degree of conflict. 4. 1 Syria Due to its geography and history, Lebanon always has to deal with Syria, whose regime had always considered it as an ‘illegitimate political entity’ that has to be dominated.According to Harris (2009: 1) â€Å"Lebanon is therefore the target of all the ambitions and phobias of the Syrian dictatorship, which cannot function as an Arab power without commanding the Lebanese†. Lebanon’s multicommunal history makes for problems of coh erence in modern Lebanese politics. â€Å"Communal suspicion—today principally on a Sunni-Shi’a fault line—produces paralysis that saps Lebanon’s viability and pluralist foundations. This is fine for a Syrian Ba’thist regime that denies there is anything significant about the Lebanese and their history, despises pluralism, and regards restored command of Lebanon as vital to its own viability as the â€Å"beating heart† of Arabism† (Harris 2009: 20). Syria and its Lebanese allies paralyzed the Lebanese state, declaring the government illegitimate, refusing to allow parliament to meet, and blocking the election of a Lebanese president after Emile Lahoud finally left office in November 2007. Syrian military intelligence manipulated so-called al-Qa’ida elements in a Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon—the Fath al-Islam group—to destabilize Lebanon, debilitate its army, and disrupt Lebanon’s Sunni commu nity† (Harris 2009: 19). â€Å"The problem is that the Syrian ruling clique will not leave Lebanon alone. It is determined on reassertion through its allies, and its victory will be the end of any decent Lebanon. Lebanese pluralism cannot coexist with Bashar al-Asad’s regime† (Harris 2009: 22).The 2005 murder of Rafik Hariri started a period of exceptional domestic political turbulence and regional tensions, it led to institutional paralysis (ICG 2010: i). Initially experts accused Damascus. It is assumed that it is part of a Syrian plot to destabilize the country. Officially no one knows who carried out the attack and who was behind it. What can be said is that the assassination of Hariri opened doors for many political actors to get into the Lebanese and Arab political scene. 4. 2 Israel â€Å"Throughout the relatively short history of their existence as modern states, Israel’s and Lebanon’s mutual border has proven to be largely disadvantageous to both countries† (Spyer 2009: 195).For Lebanon, Israel’s establishment was the primary cause for the eventual arrival of the Palestinian national movement to within its borders in 1970 (Spyer 2009: 195). This, in turn, was a key factor in precipitating the country’s ruinous civil war, the Israel-PLO war on Lebanese soil in 1982, the partial collapse of Lebanese sovereignty after the Syrian entry in 1990, and the partial Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon until 2000 (Spyer 2009: 195). The series of events that would lead to Israel’s involvement in Lebanon began with the Palestinian national movement in Lebanon. (Spyer 2009: 198). â€Å"Beirut became the international center of focus for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the place of residence of its senior leadership† (Spyer 2009: 198).As a result, Lebanon became one of the theatres in which the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians would be played out (Spyer 2009:198). Civ il order broke down in Lebanon in 1975, in a civil war in which the Palestinians played a central role. Contacts between Israel and prominent Lebanese Maronite politicians had been developing since the mid-1970s against the background of the breakdown of civil order in Lebanon and the central role of the PLO in the Muslim/ leftist coalition against which the Maronites were fighting (Spyer 2009: 199). Over time, Bashir Gemayel, most prominent among anti- Syrian Maronite leaders at the time, became the main Maronite contact for the Israelis (Spyer 2009: 199). Throughout, Bashir’s purpose was to encourage Israel to intervene against the Syrian garrison forces in Lebanon† (Spyer 2009: 199). The 1982 Lebanon War was very much the brainchild of Menachem Begin, the Israeli prime minister from 1977 till 1983 and Ariel Sharon the Israeli Minister of Defense during the war (Spyer 2009: 202). An anti-Gemayel, anti-Israel, anti-U. S. , and pro-Syrian alignment was now emerging as t he key political force in the country (Spyer 2009: 203). A number of inflammatory incidents deriving from Israel’s ignorance of the sensibilities of Shi’a Muslims contributed to the deterioration of the situation (Spyer 2009: 203). In 1985 Israeli forces occupied a strip of territory in southern Lebanon.A â€Å"security zone† close to the Israeli border, which was maintained in cooperation with the SLA (Spyer 2009: 204). Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the security zone took place in 2000, thus ending the 18-year period of Israeli military involvement on Lebanese soil (Spyer 2009: 205). The Second Lebanon War which began on July 12, 2006 was one between Hezbollah and Israel. Resolution 1701, which ended the fighting, changed the situation in southern Lebanon to Israel’s advantage, in that it ended the de facto Hezbollah domination of the southern border area that had pertained since the unilateral Israeli withdrawal in May 2000 (Spyer 2009: 208 ). Israel currently has no dealings with any of the major political actors within Lebanon.However, while large-scale Israeli adventures to make alliance with political forces within Lebanon are part of the past, the weakness of the Lebanese state and central authority remain very much part of the present. One of the results of this weakness, which is itself a product of the country’s divided sectarian makeup, is its vulnerability to outside penetration, and therefore its oft-repeated, luckless fate as the launching ground for attacks by various forces (the PLO, Syria, now Iran and Hizballah) against Israel, its southern neighbor. This fact remains the core reality behind Israel’s relations with Lebanon. It is unlikely that the final word in this story has been written. 4. 3 Iran Lebanon’s Shi’a community resides in the heart of the largely Sunni Arab world and on the frontline with Israel; therefore, Lebanon’s Shi’a are of double interest to their coreligionists in revolutionary Shi’a Iran† (Harris 2009: 10). â€Å"Hezbollah was and remains a militant Khomeinist Islamist movement that adheres to Khomeini’s doctrine of velayet-e-faqih, rule by a cleric in an Islamist state. Its ties to Iran are organic, multifaceted, and complex† (Badran 2009: 47). In order to understand Hezbollah’s origins properly, one must remember that the major force pushing for its establishment was the Islamic regime in Iran, as it worked to unite the Shi’a factions and forces operating in Lebanon (Zisser 2009: 158). Iran wanted everyone to work together under the Hezbollah framework (Zisser 2009: 158).The crisis situation that developed from the early 1970s onward became the breeding ground for a process of religious radicalization (Zisser 2009: 158). In these circumstances, Musa al-Sadr, a religious figure of Iranian origin, appeared and gained a position of great influence and power in the Shi’a community (Zisser 2009: 158). Hezbollah’s dilemma has to do with its identity, which contains a tension built into its very origins and being (Zisser 2009: 156). How is this tension—between the organization’s Lebanese-Shi’a identity on the one hand and its Islamic-revolutionary identity, its commitments to Iran, and its conception of the holy jihad on the other—to be resolved? The balance ow seems to be turning in favor of the Islamic-revolutionary identity, which also means turning in favor of Tehran (Zisser 2009: 156). There is no doubt that the war and its aftermath revealed as never before, and against the desire and interests of Hezbollah, the fact that the organization is the handiwork of Tehran, if not simply its instrument. Hezbollah has also been exposed as an organization dedicated to and active in achieving radical and far-reaching aims (Zisser 2009: 156-157). Its aim in the short term is to gain dominance over Lebanon and in the long te rm to turn that country into a Shi’a-dominated state ruled by Islamic law and closely linked to Iran (Zisser 2009: 157).From the mid- 1980s the organization began (with generous Iranian help) to establish a network of social and welfare services that would draw the support of the Shi’a community and provide it with an alternative to the services provided by the Lebanese state, or, to be more precise, to the benefits and aid the state should have provided for this population and did not (Zisser 2009: 159). With the build-up of this social infrastructure, the movement contributed to undermining the position of the Lebanese government. By the end of the 1980s the Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah grew in popularity as a force combining opposition to Israeli occupation with a wider Shi’a Islamist ideology implacably opposed to Israel’s existence and to the West (Sper 2009: 204).Hezbollah’s advance to the international boundary in southern Lebanon made it eve n more useful to its Iranian and Syrian patrons as a deterrent force in case of threats from Israel or the United States. It seemed to have it within its power to take over Lebanon—or at least those parts of the country inhabited by Shi’a—and to establish an Islamic order there on the Iranian model (Harris 2009: 71). As a result of the Iranian-Syrian agreement after the Ta’if Accord ended the Lebanese war, Hezbollah was the only militia to be excluded from handing over its weapons under the pretext that it was a â€Å"resistance movement† fighting Israeli occupation rather than a militia (Badran 2009: 47). This was a big mistake as it induces fragility.Since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 and more so after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, the fate of Hezbollah’s armed status (which has grown massively and developed doctrinally, ironically, after the Israeli withdrawal) is the central issue in Lebanon today (Badran 2009: 47). Hezbollah had pres ented itself as the â€Å"defender of Lebanon† but proved to be its ruination since it brought so much destruction down upon the heads of its people (Zisser 2009: 166). After the 2006 war Hezbollah had difficulty maintaining the ambiguity about its identity (Zisser 2009: 166). In particular, the contrasts and contradictions between the organization’s Lebanese identity and its loyalty to Iran, on the one hand, and its Islamic-revolutionary identity with its commitments to Iran, on the other, were exposed (Zisser 2009: 173).Hezbollah had tried to bridge or obscure these troublesome conflicting elements over the years (Zisser 2009: 173). Yet in the moment of truth it became clear that it was not prepared to renounce its partially hidden agenda—that is, its loyalty to Iran and the ideas of radical Islam and jihad (Zisser 2009: 173). Hezbollah was now perceived more and more as a Shi’a organization serving the interests of Iran, as well as being an organizatio n sinking deeper and deeper into the quicksand of Lebanese politics (Zisser 2009: 166). It dragged Lebanon into a bloody battle with Israel, whose price was paid, first and foremost, by the Shi’a of Lebanon but also by many other Lebanese from other ethnic communities (Zisser 2009: 173).It seems that the organization, inspired and helped by Iran, its ally and patron, is more committed than ever to continue the long and unremitting struggle it began when it was first established in the early 1980s, with the ultimate aim of taking power in Lebanon (Zisser 2009: 174). The possibility that Hezbollah might succeed in its mission has become more realistic, thanks to the demographic processes taking place in Lebanon. Hezbollah is therefore a major destabilizing factor (Zisser 2009: 175). 5. Lebanon: a conflict-affected fragile state When Lebanon gained independence in 1941, the country found itself at a loss without the French hierarchy to maintain internal control and order. A new class of political elites, with little experience, was forced to discover ways to deal with the diversity of Lebanese society. It was with this in mind that the National Pact of 1943 was crafted.The Pact was based on the census of 1932, and sought to address divisions among the Lebanese, but in the end, it would only serve to deepen them. In the years after the Arab-Israeli War, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict landed on Lebanon’s doorstep with the arrival of Palestinian commandos. Many Palestinian refugees, as well as militants, settled in camps in southern Lebanon, the legacy of which continues to influence Lebanese society. The migration of Shi’a to the capital, which was triggered by Israeli raids, heightened the already volatile mix of interests within the Lebanese political sphere. Ignored throughout the mandate years, the introduction of the confessional system saw the Shi’a fight for an equal voice alongside the Sunnis, Druze, and Maronites.As Lebanese s ociety became increasingly divided, individual sectarian groups began to arm themselves militarily through their own militia organizations. Today, these militias still play a key role within the Lebanese security sphere. Ultimately, the Palestinian presence within Lebanon acted as a trigger to the outbreak of civil war among all Lebanese factions. Although Palestinian militants were the original cause of the war, it was sectarian interest and division that sustained the conflict well into the following decade. The ceasefire agreement reached by Syria and the PLO in 1976 sealed Syrian dominance within Lebanon and has had a lasting impact on the country well into the early 2000s.Nonetheless, the agreement did little to improve sectarian division and militia violence on the ground. The decades following the 1982 Israeli War continued to be marred by sectarian conflict and an international tug of war for Lebanon. Tensions along the Lebanese-Israeli border have continued well into the pr esent day, in light of suspicions that Hezbollah is rearming for any future conflict. Ultimately, the greatest consequence of the summer war can be understood in terms of power within Lebanon. Indeed, the summer 2006 war marked the advent of power for Hezbollah, both within Lebanon and throughout the region. Considering it is a non-state actor, and that Lebanese President Fouad Siniora was in power, Hezbollah acted with state authority.This conflict reopened old wounds within Lebanese society, seeing as Hezbollah feels vindicated by the 2006 conflict and now seeks full recognition of its power. Moreover, state fragility is further deepened in a context where conflict has led to the intervention of external actors, each of whom have chosen sides in a dispute whose political and strategic consequences extend well beyond Lebanon. The current dynamics of fragile state security in Lebanon are not being dictated by Lebanese interests, but rather by the broader external policy aims of fore ign parties such as Syria, Israel, and Iran. This situation is particularly problematic for the prospects of long-term and lasting stability within Lebanon.Although sectarian politics have been an influential reality since Lebanon became a fully independent state in 1941, they have taken on a new shape in an environment defined by the post 9/11 context and by three main evolutions, namely the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese President Rafik Hariri, the 2005 withdrawal of Syrian military forces, and Hezbollah’s rise to power in Lebanon. Conclusion The central question throughout this paper has been whether Lebanon is a fragile state or not. The precarious political order of Lebanon has illustrated the distinctiveness of the country. Although colonial rule is not unique to the Lebanon, its colonial past, combined with the evolution of politics, economics, and society in the region, as well as the role played by external actors, molds a very specific set of circumstances vi s-a-vis state security that translates into an expression of fragile state security very specific to the region. The Lebanese State has always been weak.Politicians have generally sought to serve interests of their constituencies instead of the national interest. This factor has its roots in the National Pact that limited the authority of the state to maximize the autonomy of sectarian groups. As a result, Lebanese citizens feel loyalty towards their community instead of towards the country. Lebanon’s political system erodes the authority of the state by fuelling clientelism. Foreign protection of or influence on each community further undermines this authority. Moreover, Lebanon’s political system makes the state vulnerable to any stifled sense of frustration or injustice or dispossession felt by any community. Consequently, patronage networks swiftly re-emerged.In all, Lebanon’s political system is based upon the principle that the State should interfere in so ciety as little as possible. The resulting weakness of state institutions has made Lebanon vulnerable to infringements of its domestic, interdependence and sovereignty. The rise of Hezbollah has made this clear. In section 1, fragile states were defined as states that are failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive basic service provision, or legitimacy. In conclusion, in this sense, Lebanon â€Å"passed† on all three domains. Lebanon fails to protect its citizens as there is significant organized political violence; civil war’s.Also there is periodic political or communal violence causing deaths and destruction. Although the authority of the state is being undermined, it does not go as far as to say that the state authority (at present) does not extend to a significant proportion of the country. Hezbollah made sure to illustrate the inadequate delivery of services by the state. Also, in Lebanon the question of legitimacy is raised, inheren t in being a multi-communal state. â€Å"Lebanon, from all observable indicators, embodies the phenomenon of schism in the political and cultural realms (†¦) it is a society without foundation, fragile, divided, disjointed and torn† (Dr.Khalaf, cited in Raphaeli 2009: 109). Bibliography – Badran, T. (2009) ‘Lebanon’s militia wars’, in: Rubin (ed), Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 35-62. – DfID (2005) Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states . Department for International Development. – El-Khazen, F. (2000) The breakdown of the state in Lebanon, 1967-76. London : I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd – Farha, M. (2009) ‘Demographic Dilemma’s’, in: B. Rubin (ed), Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 83-99. – Foreign Policy (2011a) FAQ & Methodology, Foreign policy. Online at: http://www. foreignpolicy. om/articles/2009/06/22/200 9_failed_states_index_faq_methodology(retrieved 28 February 2011). – Foreign Policy (2011b) The Failed States Index 2010, Foreign policy. Online at: http://www. foreignpolicy. com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings (retrieved 28 February 2011). – Harris, W. (2009) ‘Lebanon’s Roller Coaster Ride’, in: B. Rubin (ed), Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 63-82. – ICG (2010) Lebanon’s Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariri’s Future Current, Middle East Report, N °96. – Iqbal, Z. and H. Starr (2007) State Failure: Conceptualization and Determinants. Working paper, University of South

French and Haitian Revolutions essays

French and Haitian Revolutions essays Throughout the French and Haitian Revolutions both political and social revolutions occurred. With the revolutions occurring first in France, lead to the need for Haitians to create there own government. A revolution takes place when people attempt to change the features of their society, that effect people as a whole. Most revolutions are decided by mass violence, which cant be controlled by the ones that started the action. Power over nations doesnt always come to the most authoritative and successful leaders, but also to countries that have financial success. Leading into 1614, France struggled to be financially secured. Louis XVI found a problem with the governments technique of selling congressional chairs to produce profit, because it took the absolute power that the king had previously. With the king beginning to feel pressured, steps where taken to prevent the public to become part of the governing body. In 1789, the Estates-General meet for the first time since 1614. The Estate-General was called to deal with the financial crisis. This Estate-General consists of the First Estate, the clergy, the Second Estate, the nobility, and the Third Estate, commoners. There purpose was to address the parliament of Paris, because of an attack on the parliament that gives agreement to the royal plan for taxing the nobility. At this point Louis XVI expected not to lose power to the owners of seats (nobles), or commissioners that made up what was called the third estate. The third estate was composed of a group that held one vote. This group was complied from the rich merchants to the poor peasants. These people where normally out voted by the other two estates, and they felt they were being deal with unfairly. With being barred from attending a meeting, the members met at in an indoor tennis court, where they came up with the Tennis Court Oath, which would break away from the Estate-General, and declare them the National As...

The Neuter Gender in Spanish

The Neuter Gender in Spanish Él and ella. Nosotros and nosotras. El and la. Un and una. El profesor and la profesora. In Spanish, everything is either masculine or feminine, right? Not quite. True, Spanish isnt like German, where in terms of gender nouns fall into three classifications (masculine, feminine, and neuter). Indeed, in Spanish, nouns are either masculine or feminine. But Spanish does have use for the neuter form, which can come in handy when referring to concepts or ideas. The thing to keep in mind about Spanishs neuter form is that it is never used to refer to known objects or people, and there are no neuter nouns or descriptive adjectives. Here, then, are the cases where youll see the neuter used: Lo as the Neuter Definite Article Chances are that youre familiar with el and la, which usually are translated as the in English. Those words are known as definite articles because they refer to definite things or people (el libro, for example, refers to a specific book). Spanish also has a neuter definite article, lo, but you cant use it before a noun like you do el or la because there are no neuter nouns. Instead, lo is used before singular adjectives (and sometimes possessive pronouns) when they function as nouns, usually referring to a concept or category, not to a single concrete object or a person. If youre translating into English, there is no one way in which lo is always translated; youll usually need to supply a noun, the choice of which depends on the context. In most cases, what is is a possible translation for lo. A sample sentence should help make this easier to understand: Lo importante es amar. Here importante is the adjective (generally in the masculine singular when used with lo) functioning as a noun. You could use a variety of English translations: The important thing is to love. What is important is to love. The important aspect is to love. Here are some other sample sentences with possible translations: Lo mejor es el baà ±o. (The best part is the bathroom. The best thing is the bathroom.)Lo nuevo es que estudia. (Whats new is that hes studying. The new thing is that he studies.)Me gusta lo francà ©s. (I like French things. I like what is French.)Le di lo inà ºtil a mi hermana. (I gave the useless stuff to my sister. I gave the useless items to my sister. I gave what was useless to my sister. Note that you couldnt use lo à ºtil for a specific object that has a name. If were referring to a useless spoon, for example, you could say la inà ºtil  because the word for spoon, cuchara, is feminine.  )Puedes pintar lo tuyo. (You can paint whats yours. You can paint your things.) It is also possible to use lo in this way with some adverbs, but this usage isnt as common as the cases above: Me enojà ³ lo tarde que salià ³. (It angered me how late he left. The lateness of his leaving angered me.) Lo as a Neuter Direct Object Lo is used to represent an idea or concept when it is the direct object of a verb. (This may not look like a neuter use, because lo can also be used as a masculine pronoun.) In such usages, lo is usually translated as it. No lo creo. (I dont believe it.)Lo sà ©. (I know it.)No lo comprendo. (I dont understand it.)No puedo creerlo. (I cant believe it.) In these cases, lo/it doesnt refer to an object, but to a statement that has been made earlier or that is understood. Neuter Demonstrative Pronouns Usually, demonstrative pronouns are used to point at an object: à ©ste (this one), à ©se (that one), and aquà ©l (that one over there). The neuter equivalents (esto, eso, and aquello) are all unaccented, end in -o, and have roughly the same meanings, but as is the case with the direct object lo, they usually refer to an idea or concept rather than an object or person. They can also refer to an unknown object. Here are some examples of its use: No olvides esto. (Dont forget this.)No creo eso. (I dont believe that.0 ¿Quà © es aquello? (What is that over there?) ¿Te gustà ³ eso? (Did you like that?)No me importa esto. (This isnt important to me.) Note that the final two sentences must refer to an event, situation, or process rather than an object with a name. For example, if youre walking in a dark jungle and get a creepy feeling about something that might happen, no me gusta esto would be appropriate. But if youre sampling a hamburger and dont care for it, no me gusta à ©sta would be appropriate (à ©sta is used because the word for hamburger, hamburguesa, is feminine). Ello Ello is the neuter equivalent of à ©l and ella. Its use these days is unusual, and only in literature are you likely to find it used as the subject of a sentence. It usually is translated as it or this. Note that in these examples, ello refers to an unnamed situation rather than a specified thing. Hemos aprendido a vivir con ello. (We have learned to live with it.)Por ello no pudo encontrar la trascendencia que hubiera deseado. (Because of it, he couldnt find the transcendence he had wanted.)

SECONDARY AMENORRHEA Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

SECONDARY AMENORRHEA - Assignment Example Pregnancy has been shown to be the primary factor leading to the development of secondary amenorrhea (Newson, 2013). The paper will discuss the possible causes of secondary amenorrhea in a female patient 20 and 45 years of age. It will also give a brief overview of each diagnosis with signs and symptoms. There are various causes of secondary amenorrhea; however, there are six major causes for the condition. The first major cause is psychogenic stress (Gindoff & Jewelewicz, 2015). Various forms of stress are said to lead to the development of amenorrhea. Stress is said to lead to increased production of a corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) (Gindoff & Jewelewicz, 2015). This alters the hormones responsible for menses. The cause has no particular diagnostic test. However, women with stress as a cause show increased basal plasma cortisol (Gindoff & Jewelewicz, 2015). The second significant cause for this condition is loss of weight. Those women that experience loss of weight may fail to menstruate. Lack of menstruation in this scenario is due to changes in hypothalamia (Gindoff & Jewelewicz, 2015). The condition may return to normal when one gains weight. Exercise is also a cause for secondary amenorrhea. Those women that involve themselves in sports have a higher chance of acquiring the condition (Gindoff & Jewelewicz, 2015). In this case, physical, hormonal, nutritional, psychological, and environmental factors exert a significant influence in developing the condition (Gindoff & Jewelewicz, 2015). In amenorrheic athletes, the cause is associated with high cortisol levels. Moreover, discontinuation of pill is associated with the development of the condition. Those women that stop taking contraceptives are most likely to develop amenorrhea (Gindoff & Jewelewicz, 2015). Also, some drugs are responsible for development of the condition. The hypothalamic or central nervous system effects of drugs leads to the development of the syndrome (Gindoff &